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DISCRIMINATION CASES
IN THE SUPREME COURT'S 1997 TERM
Eileen R. Kaufman*
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
Our next speaker is the Vice-Dean of Touro and an expert in the
area of sexual harassment and discrimination in general. She has
lectured on these subjects numerous times before various groups
including the Supreme Court Justices Association. She is also a
reporter for the Pattern Jury Instruction Committee, and she is a
first class lawyer, and, as you are going to hear in a moment, she is
a first class speaker. Dean Kaufman.
Dean Eileen Kaufman:
Thank you, Leon. The Supreme Court decided a record number
of discrimination cases last term; four dealing with sexual
harassment, two with disability discrimination, and the last with
discrimination based on gender but within an immigration context.
My focus today will be on the sexual harassment cases because,
undoubtedly, they were among the most important decisions of the
term.
The fact that the court decided four sexual harassment cases in
one term is truly astounding given the fact that this has been an
area of law not known for high court guidance. To the delight of
all parties concerned with the enforcement of sexual harassment
laws, and I include women's rights groups, chambers of
commerce, the practicing bar, and the federal bench itself, these
cases resolved a "bewildering array" of lower court opinions. The
decisions eliminated considerable confusion on a number of issues,
such as whether same sex sexual harassment is cognizable under
Title VII,' and under what circumstances an employer can be liable
* Vice Dean and Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law
Center. B.A., Skidmore College, 1970; J.D., New York University, 1975;
L.L.M., New York University, 1992. In addition to serving as Vice Dean and
Professor of Law at Touro Law Center, Dean Kaufmnan has been a Managing
Attorney at Westchester Legal Services, Inc. and serves on the New York State
Bar Association President's Committee on Access to Justice, and is a Reporter
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for sexual harassment practiced by a supervisor, or a school district
for harassment by a teacher.
In the first case, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,2 the
Court held that Title VII does indeed encompass same sex sexual
harassment. The plaintiff, Joseph Oncale, worked for Sundowner
as a roustabout on an oil platform.3 He was a member of an eight-
man crew, some of whom had supervisory authority over him.
Those supervisors forcibly subjected him to sex-related,
humiliating actions, including physically assaulting him in a sexual
way and threatening him with rape.5 The Supreme Court opinion
spares us the precise and rather gory details "in the interest of
brevity and dignity," although the Court of Appeals opinion
describes, among other things, a forcible sodomy incident
involving a bar of soap.
6
Plaintiff complained about this conduct to a supervisor who
failed to respond.7 Oncale then quit and requested that his pink
slip note that he "voluntarily left due to sexual harassment and
verbal abuse.' '  Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit
concluded he had no cause of action because Title VII does not
encompass same sex sexual harassment. 9 The Supreme Court
reversed, in a short, unanimous decision, analogizing to racial
discrimination, where the Court rejects any presumption that an
for the New York Pattern Jury Instructions. She has published primarily in the
area of civil rights law.
1 Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) provides, in
relevant part, that "[I]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's ... sex...."
2 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) [hereinafter Oncale I].3 Id. at 1000.4 Id. at 1001.
5Id.
6 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir.
1996) [hereinafter Oncale II].
7 Oncale I, supra note 2, at 1001.
81d.
9 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4119;
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (1996). The Fifth
Circuit cited as binding Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F.3d 446,
451-52 (5th Cir. 1994).
[Vol 15
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employer will not discriminate against members of his or her own
race.10 The Court said, "nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a
claim of discrimination because of sex merely because the plaintiff
and the defendant are of the same sex."
11
Further, in a very important clarification, the Court stated that
"harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to
support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex."' 2 So,
for example, conduct that signifies a general hostility to women in
the workplace would be actionable harassment. The conduct does
not have to be related to sexual desire.
In response to the concern that this decision will convert Title VII
into a general civility code for the American workplace, the Court
emphasized that the statute prohibits only that behavior that is so
objectively offensive as to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment. 13 Quoting from Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,14
and Meritor Savings Bank FB v. Vinson, 15 the Court's previous
two forays into the world of sexual harassment, the Court
reiterated that conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to
create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment
(environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive), is beyond Title VIl's purview.16
In Harris, which we discussed at this conference a few years
ago, 7 the Court adopted a standard that has both a subjective and
objective component: subjective in that the actual victim must
perceive and experience the environment to be hostile and
objective in that it has to be offensive to a reasonable person in the
10 Oncale I, supra note 1 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499
(1977)).
" Id. at 1002.
12 id.13 md.
14 51 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (holding that to be actionable as an "abusive work
environment," harassing conduct need not affect the claimant's psychological
well being or cause the claimant to suffer injury).
15 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (noting that the correct inquiry on the issue of sexual
harassment was whether sexual advances were unvelcome, not whether
employee's participation in them was voluntary). The first sexual harassment
case to reach the United States Supreme Court was Meritor. Id.
16 Oncale I, supra note 2, at 1003.
17 Eileen Kaufman, Employment Discrimination: Recent Developments in the
Supreme Court, 11 TouRO L. REv. 465, 468-471 (1995).
1999
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plaintiff's position.18 Thus, the statute does not reach what Justice
Scalia refers to as "genuine but innocuous differences in the ways
men and women routinely interact with members of the same sex
and of the opposite sex,"' 9 nor does it reach ordinary socializing in
the workplace such as, male-on-male horseplay or intersexual
flirtation, nor does it require asexuality or androgyny in the
workplace.2 0
The Court reaffirmed in this decision that the objective severity
of the harassment must be judged "from the perspective of a
reasonable person in the plaintiffs position" and with common
sense and an appropriate sensitivity to social context.2' What does
that mean? The Court uses the following illustration:
[a] professional football player's working environment is
not severely or pervasively abusive if the coach smacks
him on the buttocks as he heads onto the field, but the
same behavior would reasonably be experienced as
abusive by the coach's secretary, be that secretary male or
female, back at the office.22
While this decision certainly clarifies the issue by rejecting not
only those cases holding that same sex harassment is never
cognizable under Title VII, but also those cases requiring the
plaintiff to prove that the harasser is homosexual and motivated in
his behavior by sexual desire, the decision, nevertheless, injects a
new uncertainty into the area.
Let me explain what I mean. In his decision, Justice Scalia
repeatedly emphasized that Title VII proscribes discrimination.3 It
is a difference in treatment, discrimination, that is at the heart of
Title VII. Justice Scalia commented that the critical issue is
whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms
or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex
18 Harris, supra note 14, at 21.
19 Oncale I, supra note 2, at 1003.
20 Oncale I at 1003.
2 1 id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1001,1002 (stating for example, "Title VII's prohibition of
discrimination 'because of ... sex,"' and "Title VII ... is directed only at
'discrimination... because of... sex."')
[Vol 15
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are not exposed.' The plaintiff must always prove that the conduct
at issue was "not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations
but actually constituted sexual 'discrimination' ... because of...
sex."
5
The question raised by that language is what about the equal
opportunity harasser, the employer who creates a hostile
environment for both men and women, or the employer who offers
job advancement to both males and females in exchange for sexual
favors. Does this decision mean that such conduct would not be
encompassed under Title VII? While that does not seem consistent
with the statutory objectives, a literal reading of Justice Scalia's
opinion does raise the question.
The next pair of cases, which were decided on the last day of the
term, were probably the two most important sexual harassment
cases of the term. The Court resolved an issue that had generated
considerable confusion in lower courts, the issue of employer
liability. Under what circumstances will an employer be liable for
sexual harassment practiced by a supervisor? In Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth26 and Farager v. City of Boca Raton,27
the Court laid out a definitive and detailed rule for resolving these
issues and, in doing so, brought some needed coherence to what
had been a previously muddled area of law.
The plaintiff in Burlington Industries, Kimberly Ellerth, was a
saleswoman who was subjected to constant sexual harassment by
her supervisor, a middle-level manager.28  The supervisor
repeatedly made comments about her body, told her to loosen up,
and said, "You know Kim, I could make your life very hard or
very easy at Burlington."29 When she was being considered for
promotion he again said to her she was not loose enough and he
then rubbed her knee.30 She received the promotion, but was told
by her supervisor'hat "you're going to be out there with men that
work in factories and they certainly like women with pretty butts
24 Id. (citing Harris, supra at 25, 126 L.Ed.2d 295, 114 S. Ct. 367 (Ginsburg,
J., concurring).
25 Id. at 1003.
26 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998) (hereinafter Burlington).
27 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
28 Burlington, supra, note 26, at 2262.
29 Id.
30 Id.
1999 939
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and legs.",3 1 On one occasion, when she called him, he responded
by saying, "I don't have time for you now, Kim, unless you tell me
what you're wearing." 32  A few days later, he said, "are you
wearing shorter skirts yet, Kim, because it would make your job a
heck of a lot easier." 33 A short time later, plaintiff quit. Although
her initial explanation of her resignation did not refer to sexual
harassment or to the conduct of her supervisor, three weeks later
she sent a letter in which she explained that she quit because of her
supervisor's conduct.
34
Her Title VII claim was dismissed in the district court.
35
Although it found the conduct to be sufficiently pervasive and
severe to constitute a hostile environment, the Court concluded that
the employer, Burlington Industries, did not have actual or
constructive knowledge of the supervisor's behavior and,
therefore, could not be found liable.36 The Seventh Circuit en bane
reversed, producing eight opinions with eight different views on
what the governing standard should be when a supervisor threatens
to alter a subordinate's terms or conditions but does not follow
through on the threat.37 It is in that posture that the case reached
the Supreme Court.
The Court looked at principles of agency law,38 particularly the
Restatement of Agency, Section 219(1), which imposes liability on
employers for torts committed by employees while acting within
31 id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 id.
35 Ellerth v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(hereinafter Ellerth).36 Id.
37 123 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1997)(en banc). The court stated"... certain
views commend a majority within our court: in particular, that the standard for
employer liability in cases of hostile-environment sexual harassment by a
supervisory employee, is negligence, not strict liability, and that liability for
quidpro quo harassment is strict even if the supervisor's threat does not result in
a company act." Id.
38 Id. at 2266. The Court used the definition of "employer" under Title VII
which includes "agents." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)).
940 [Vol 15
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the scope of employment.3 9  This is basic respondeat superior
liability. Since scope of employment analysis typically requires
conduct that, at least partially, benefits the employer, it will rarely
serve as a predicate for imposing liability in sexual harassment
cases because that kind of conduct is more likely to be actuated by
purely personal desires. In tort law, we talk about the difference
between a frolic and a detour when we talk about vicarious
liability. Sexual harassment would clearly be treated as a frolic
and, therefore, not within the scope of employment.
Other subsections of Section 219(2) of the Restatement provide
alternate bases for imposing employer liability.40 The first is the
negligence standard, Section 219(2)(b), which provides for
employer liability when the employer has been negligent or
reckless. 41  The "employer is negligent with respect to sexual
harassment if it knew or should have known about the conduct and
failed to stop it.''42  Second, Section 219(2)(d) provides for
employer liability when the employee was aided in accomplishing
the harassment by the agency relationship.43 Most of the Court's
analysis is directed at the "aided by the relationship" standard."
The most obvious category of cases calling for vicarious liability
is the category of cases involving a tangible, concrete, adverse
employment action. There, it is clear that the "aided by the
relationship" standard is easily satisfied, because there is no other
way that the supervisor could have brought about that adverse
employment action. Examples include a firing, the denial of a
39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(l) (1957). This section states in
pertinent part: "A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants
committed while acting in the scope of their employment." Id.
40 Id. at § 219(2). This section states in pertinent part:
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants
acting outside the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal
and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
41 Id. at § 219(2)(b).
42 Id.
43 Id. at§ 219(2)(d).44 m.
1999
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promotion, the denial of a raise, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change
in benefits. 4? In that category of cases, the Court has little trouble
imposing vicarious liability on the employer regardless of whether
the employer knew or should have known about the supervisor's
actions. In such cases, it is obvious that the supervisor could not
have inflicted the harm absent the agency relationship. "The
supervisor has been empowered by the company as a distinct class
of agent to make economic decisions affecting other employees
under his or her control ' '46 and thus, "a tangible employment action
taken by the supervisor becomes, for Title VII purposes, the act of
the employer." 7 Thus, the Court is, in effect, reaffirming that in
quid pro quo type cases (i.e., sexual favors in exchange for some
advancement in the workplace),48 the employer will be vicariously
liable.49
The more problematic category of cases and the ones that have
generated such confusion in the lower courts, are those not
involving a tangible employment action, typically, the hostile
environment cases. There, it is harder to determine whether the
supervisor whose conduct created the hostile environment has
really been aided by the agency relationship.
One could say that the supervisor always is aided by the agency
relationship, because "a supervisor's power and authority invests
his or her harassing conduct with a particularly threatening
character."5  However, there may be other instances when the
supervisor's conduct differs little from what might be
accomplished by a co-employee, one with no power and no
45 Burlington, supra note 26, at 2268-69.
46 Id. at 2269.
47 Id.
48 See generally E. Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual
Harassment, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLICY 307 (1998).
49 Burlington, supra note 26, at 2266. (noting that the "law now imposes
liability on employers where the employee's 'purpose, however misguided, is
wholly or in part to further the master's business."') (quoting W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at 505 (5th ed.
1984).
so Id.
942 [Vol 15
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supervisory authority over the plaintiff.5' In those cases, the
supervisor's status may make no difference at all.1"
Ultimately, the Court concludes that a consideration of agency
principles must be tempered with a consideration of the objectives
of Title VII, particularly Title VII's goal of encouraging employers
to create anti-harassment policies and to develop effective
grievance procedures.53  The Court fashions a rule that
accommodates agency principles of vicarious liability for harm
caused by misuse of supervisory authority as well as Title VII's
equally basic policy of encouraging forethought by employers and
saving action by objecting employees.5 4
The rule the Court announces is that an employer is subject to
vicarious liability for an actionable hostile environment created by
a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority
over the employee. However, when no tangible employment
action is taken, the employer may raise an affirmative defense
consisting of two elements, first, "that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and to promptly correct any sexually
harassing behavior," and, second, "that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to otherwise
avoid harm."55  The second part sounds like the avoidable
consequences doctrine in tort law.5"
In fashioning this rule, the Court reviewed the history of the two
categories of sexual harassment, quid pro quo harassment 7 and
5
' 
1 d. at 2269.
52 id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
-5 Id. at 2270 (hereinafter referred to as the "Burlington rule.").
56 For a discussion of the application of the avoidable consequences doctrine
in this context, see Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219,232, n.15.
57 See Karibian v. Columbia University, 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S.Ct. 2693 (1994) (stating that "liability for quid pro quo harassment is
always imputed to the employer.. ."). See also Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (noting that agency principles would provide sound
guidance in sexual harassment cases); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d
178, 185-86 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that "[u]nder a quid pro quo theory of
sexual harassment, an employer is held strictly liable for the conduct of its
supervisory employees... under a theory of respondeat superior"); Carrero v.
New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that "in
1999 943
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hostile environment harassment," terms originally proposed by
Catherine MacKinnon59 and subsequently adopted by the courts.6"
The Court concludes that when it comes to determining employer
liability, the two labels are not dispositive.6" The labels do remain
useful, however, in illustrating the difference between fulfilled
threats and offensive conduct.6" Therefore, they should still be
used in evaluating the threshold question of whether discrimination
within the meaning of Title VII has been established.63
Because Kimberly Ellerth had relied on preexisting case law that
had established different rules of employer liability depending
upon whether the claim is quidpro quo or hostile environment, the
Court remanded the case for further development consistent with
its newly announced rule.64 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice
Scalia, filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that in cases involving
hostile environment created by a supervisor, employer liability
should only be imposed when the employer was negligent in
permitting the conduct to occur.65
a quidpro quo sexual harassment case the employer is held strictly liable for its
employee's unlawful acts"); Steele v. Off Shore Shipbuilding Inc., 867 F.2d
1311, 1316 (1lth Cir. 1989) (holding that "the corporate defendant is strictly
liable for the supervisor's harassment"); Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915
F.2d 777, 785 (1st Cir. 1970) (reiterating that "'an employer is strictly liable for
the actions of its supervisors that amount to sexual discrimination or sexual
harassment resulting in tangible job detriment to the subordinate
employee"'(quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (1 1th Cir.
1982)).
58 Burlington, supra note 26, at 2270.
59 CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN:
A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).
60 See Meritor Sav. Bank, supra note 15.
6 1 Burlington, supra note 26, at 2265. The Court clearly states that "[w]hen we
assume discrimination can be proved.. ., the factors we discuss below, and not
the categories quidpro quo and hostilee work environment, will be controlling
on the issue of vicarious liability." Id.
62 Id.
63 id.
64 Id. at 227 1.
65 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2271 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas argued that
discrimination in the "terms, conditions, or privileges" of employment as
defined under Title VII should be evaluated by the same standards, independent
of the type of discrimination. Id. The dissent cites numerous race
discrimination cases which have been determined under a negligence standard
when the claim has been racially hostile work environment. Id. at 2271-72. As
10
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In the second case dealing with employer liability, Fara Jher v.
Boca Raton," the Court applied the Burlington rule.6  Like
Burlington, Faragher involved what we would call a "hostile
environment claim."6 Beth Ann Faragher worked as a lifeguard
for the Parks and Recreation Department of the City of Boca
Raton.69 She alleged that her immediate supervisors subjected her,
as well as other female lifeguards to uninvited and offensive
touching, citing as an example an instance when one supervisor,
Terry, put his arm around her and put his hand on her buttocks. 70
Terry also made "crudely demeaning references to women
generally" and once commented disparagingly about the plaintiff s
shape.7' When interviewing a woman for a job as lifeguard, Terry
told her that "female lifeguards had sex with their male
counterparts and asked her whether she would do the same.
' 72
Another supervisor, Silverman, behaved similarly. He once
tackled the plaintiff and said that, "but for a physical characteristic
he found unattractive, he would readily have sexual relations with
her."73 He pantomimed an act of oral sex, he made repeated vulgar
references to women and sexual matters, commented on the bodies
of the female employees and told them he wanted to have sex with
them.74  The plaintiff did not complain to higher management
about the conduct of either of these two supervisors, Terry or
Silverman, although she did speak to one rather low level
supervisor who responded by saying that the City just doesn't care
Title VII is a broad employment discrimination statute, Justice Thomas argues
against developing new standards or rules which are only applicable to one
branch of claims under the statute. Id. at 2275.
66 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
67 Burlington, supra note 54, at 2270.
68 Faragher, supra note 27, at 2279. As Justice Souter stated, the issue in this
case was "identification of the circumstances under which an employer may be
held liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (citations omitted) for
the acts of a supervisory employee whose sexual harassment of subordinates has
created a hostile work environment amounting to employment discrimination."
Id.
69 Id. at 2279.
70 Id. at 2280.
71 Id. at 2281.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
1999 945
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about this. He did not forward the complaint to any higher
official.75
Eventually another female employee did complain about the
conduct of Terry and Silverman to the personnel director, who
investigated the complaint, found that the two men had acted
improperly, reprimanded them, and gave them a choice of
suspension without pay or the forfeiture of annual leave.76
Interestingly, the City of Boca Raton had adopted a sexual
harassment policy," but had failed to distribute the policy to the
marine safety section, so the two supervisors and most of the
lifeguards were completely unaware that such a policy existed. As
we will see, that proved important in the Court's decision.
78
The District Court found that the behavior of Terry and
Silverman created a hostile environment and the city was liable for
their conduct.79 The Eleventh Circuit agreed, but only to the extent
this was a hostile environment. 80  It reversed with respect to
imposing employer liability and the full Court of Appeals, sitting
en banc, agreed. 1
The Supreme Court, with Justice Souter writing for a seven-two
majority, adopted the Burlington rule and reversed the Eleventh
Circuit. 2 Applying that rule to these facts, the Court found in
favor of Faragher, finding that a remand was not necessary. There
is no question, the Court concluded, that the conduct of the two
supervisors created an actionable hostile environment nor was
75 Id. at 2281. Faragher indicated that her conversations with this supervisor
were tantamount to a discussion with a person she held in high esteem, and not
intended as a comversation with her supervisor. Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 2280.
78 Id. at 2292.
79 864 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1994). The district court found three
justifications for concluding that the supervisor's conduct was "discriminatory
harassment sufficiently serious to alter the conditions of Faragher's
employment." Id. at 1562-63. These were: (a) harassment sufficiently pervasive
to allow an inference of the City's "knowledge, or constructive knowledge" of
it; (b) liability under traditional agency principles; and, (c) imputation of liability
to the city for an employee's failure to act. Id. at 1563-64.
80 76 F.3d 1155, 1167 (lth Cir.1996), affd, 111 F.3d 1530 (11th Cir. 1997)
(en banc).
81 Id.
82 Faragher, supra note 27, at 2292-93.
946 [Vol 15
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there any question that the supervisors had "virtually unchecked
authority" over the plaintiff
83
What about the affirmative defense that is offered to employers
under the Burlington rule? The Court said the affirmative defense
offered no protection to the City of Boca Raton, because, although
the city had drafted a sexual harassment policy, it had failed to
disseminate it effectively. Further, the policy itself failed to
include a procedure for bypassing the harassing supervisors when
registering complaints.84 Thus, the Court found, as a matter of law,
that the City of Boca Raton could not prove the affirmative defense
because it had not exercised reasonable care to prevent the
supervisor's conduct."
In essence, what the Court did in Burlington and Faragher is
formulate a broad rule of vicarious liability in Title VII cases that
effectively imposes vicarious liability on employers when
supervisors engage in sexual harassment, regardless of whether the
employer had actual or constructive knowledge of what was going
on. When harassment results in a tangible employment action, it is
strict liability, no affirmative defense is available. However, when
no tangible employment action results, the employer may raise an
affirmative defense consisting of two elements; that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct the
behavior and that the employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities or to
otherwise avoid harm." It seems clear, after reading these
decisions, that the safest way for employers to protect themselves
against liability in cases of supervisory harassment, at least in
those cases that do not involve tangible employment actions, is to
promulgate and to distribute effectively an anti-sexual harassment
policy with an effective and clear grievance procedure. Not
surprisingly, virtually every article that has appeared since these
decisions were announced counsels employers to do just that.
83 Id. at 2293.
84Id.
85 Id.
86 See Burlington, supra note 26, at 2270 and Faragher, supra note 27 at 2293.
This is a restatement of the Burlington rule.
1999
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The fourth sexual harassment case of the term, Gebser v. Lago
Vista Independent School District,87 goes the other way. It raised
the same issue of employer liability for supervisory harassment,
but this time, in the context of school districts under Title IX.88
Interestingly, the Court did not utilize the Burlington rule and
instead adopted a very restrictive rule pursuant to which a school
district will only be liable for the harassment of a student by a
teacher if a school district official who, at a minimum, has
authority to institute corrective measures on the district's behalf,
had actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher's
misconduct.
8 9
This case involved an eighth grader, Ms. Gebser, who joined a
book club led by a teacher, Frank Waldrop.90 In the course of
discussions in the book club, he repeatedly made sexually
suggestive comments. 91 In the ninth grade, the plaintiff was
assigned to classes taught by Mr. Waldrop in both the fall and the
spring semesters. 92  In those classes, he began to address his
sexually suggestive comments to Ms. Gebser directly. 93 In the
spring semester, he visited her in her home "ostensibly to give her
a book," and while there, kissed and fondled her. Not long after
that, in the balance of that term and into the summer and the next
term, they repeatedly had sexual intercourse, often during school
hours but not on school property. 94 Plaintiff did not report the
conduct to school officials because, she said, she wanted to
continue to have him as her teacher. 
95
The parents of two other students did complain to the principal
about Waldrop making sexually suggestive comments in class.
96
The principal spoke to Waldrop, who apologized and said it would
87 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
88 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, as amended,
20 U. S. C. § 1681 etseq. (hereinafter Title IX).
89 Gebser, supra note 86, at 2000.
90 Id. at 1993.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 id.
94 id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
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not happen again.97 The principal did not report the incident to the
superintendent of schools, who was the district's Title IX
coordinator.
98
A few months later, Waldrop was arrested when a police officer
discovered Waldrop and the plaintiff having sex.99 He was fired
immediately and his teaching license was revoked by the Texas
Education Agency. 100 During the relevant period of time, from the
time he began his comments in class through the sexual
relationship that he had with the plaintiff, the school district did not
have any official grievance procedure for lodging complaints of
sexual harassment, nor had it promulgated any formal anti-
harassment policy.'
0
'
Gebser brought suit against Waldrop raising state law claims and
against the school district raising Title IX claims as well as claims
under Section 1983 and state negligence law.' The District Court
rejected her Title IX claim against the school district, finding that
the school district lacked actual or constructive knowledge of the
teacher's conduct. 10 3 The Fifth Circuit affirmed.'04
With Justice O'Connor writing for a five to four majority, the
Court distinguished Title IX from Title VI'01 and declined to
97 Id.
9 Id.
9 Id.
100 Id.
1O1 Id.
102 Gebser and her mother filed suit under Title KC, Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and state negligence law against the school district and the
teacher. Subsequent to lower court action, Gebser appealed only on the Title IX
claim. Id. at 1993-94.
103 Id.
104 Doe v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir.
1997). The Appeals Court only had before it the Title IX claim and relied on its
decision in Rosa H. V. San Elizario Independent School Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th
Cir. 1997). There the Fifth Circuit held that "school districts are not liable in
tort for teacher-student sexual harassment under Title IX unless an employee
who has been invested by the school board with supervisory power over the
offending employee actually knew of the abuse, had the power to end the abuse,
and failed to do so." Id. at 1226.
105 Gebser, supra note 86, at 1997. Justice O'Connor stated that the central
aim of Title VII was to "compensate victims of discrimination" while Title IX
was directed at "'protecting' individuals from discriminatory practices carried
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impose liability on the school district for the harassment of a
student by a teacher. 106 Her reasoning went something like this:
Title IX, unlike Title VII, does not explicitly confer a private right
of action."7 But, in Cannon v. University of Chicago,'° the Court
had held that Title IX is enforceable through an implied right of
action 109 and, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,"' the
Court held that monetary damages are available in the implied
private action. l ' Without overruling either precedent, the Court
concluded that, where a private right of action has been judicially
implied, the Court, "has a measure of latitude to shape a sensible
remedial scheme that best comports with the statute."
112
The remedial scheme that seemed sensible to the Court was to
impose liability on the school district only when it actually knew
of harassment. Constructive knowledge will not suffice, meaning
that negligence is not good enough. Not only must the school
district have actual knowledge, its response must amount to
deliberate indifference to discrimination.' 3 There can be little
doubt that this standard renders it virtually impossible for a school
district to be liable for a school teacher's sexual harassment of a
student.
The Court justifies the result by pointing to the fact that, unlike
Title VII, Title IX is framed in terms of a condition on federal
funding, not an outright prohibition of discrimination. 114 Title IX
conditions federal funding on a promise not to discriminate."1
5
Moreover, the Court concludes that Title IX itself "contains
important clues that Congress did not intend to allow recovery in
out by recipients of federal funds. Id. at 1997 (citing Cannon, supra note 111, at
704).
'0. Id. at 2000.
107 id.
'o' 41 U.S. 677 (1979).
109 Id.
10503 U.S. 60 (1992).
11' Id.
112 Gebser, supra note 96, at 1996.
13 Id. at 1999.
"'4 Id. at 1998.
115 Id.
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damages where liability rests solely on principles of vicarious
liability or constructive notice." 1 6 What is the clue?
The clue, Justice O'Connor said, is the administrative
enforcement mechanism, found in the statute, that requires actual
notice to the recipient of federal funds and an opportunity for
voluntary compliance before a non-compliance proceeding can be
brought. 1 7  The Court concludes that this administrative
mechanism makes sense because it avoids "diverting education
funding from beneficial uses where a recipient was unaware of
discrimination in its programs and is willing to institute corrective
measures."18 Imposing vicarious liability on a school district for
sexual harassment of a student by a teacher would be
fundamentally at odds with that objective."19 Ultimately, the Court
concludes that "where a statute's express enforcement scheme
hinges its most severe sanction, loss of federal funding, on notice
and unsuccessful efforts to obtain compliance, we cannot attribute
to Congress the intention to have an implied enforcement scheme
that allows imposition of greater liability without comparable
conditions." 1
20
Thus the Court holds that a school district is not liable for the
discriminatory conduct of a teacher unless it had actual notice and
in its response exhibited deliberate indifference to the
discrimination. 121 Applying that standard to the facts, the Court
concludes that the school district lacked actual notice. The fact it
had failed to promulgate an anti-harassment policy and did not
have any grievance procedure in place proves irrelevant under this
standard." That is a result very different from the rule announced
in the two Title VII cases.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
wrote in dissent, pointing out the obvious, that "few Title IX
plaintiffs who have been victims of intentional discrimination will
be able to recover damages under this exceedingly high
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1998.
11 Id. at 1999.
119 Id.
120 id.
121 Id. at 1999. The Court identifies its adoption in § 1983 cases of the
dehberate indifference standard as a comparable analysis. Id.
122 Id.
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standard."' 23  The dissent relied in part on Department of
Education regulations that provide for vicarious liability when the
teacher was aided in accomplishing the harassment by virtue of the
teacher's position of authority within the institution. 1
4
The dissent argued that imposing vicarious liability makes sense
because it serves to induce the school district to adopt and enforce
practices to prevent this kind of behavior, and that the rule adopted
by the majority does exactly the opposite. By requiring actual
notice, the majority rule creates a negative incentive for school
boards that can claim immunity by insulating themselves from
knowledge about the conduct."z If the person with the authority to
correct the situation puts a wall around himself or herself and
exhibits a demeanor of "I don't want to know," then the school
will never have actual notice.'26 Even if every teacher in the
district knew about the harassing behavior, the district would not
be liable because teachers do not have the authority to institute
corrective measures on the district's behalf, and thus their actual
knowledge would not count.
Justice Ginsburg wrote a short dissent indicating that she would
offer the school district the opportunity to assert an affirmative
defense similar to the one announced in Burlington. 1
27
Interestingly, the Supreme Court announced that it would hear
another Title IX case this term. The case is Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education,128 which raises the question whether a
school district can be liable when a teacher fails to intervene after
being told that one student was sexually harassing another.' 2 9 In
Davis, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the Title IX action against
the school district, finding that Title IX does not encompass claims
of sexual harassment of one student by another. 3  Given the
decision of Gebser, where the Court declined to impose liability on
123 Id. at 2005 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124 Id. at 2004 (citing Dept. of Education, Office for Civil Rights, Sexual
Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other
Students, or Third Parties, 62 FED. REG. 12034, 12039 (1997)).
w Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 2007 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
128 119 S. Ct. 29 (1998).
129 Id.
130 120 F.3d 1390 (1lth Cir. 1997).
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a school district for a teacher's intentional misconduct, I think it
unlikely that the Court will impose liability on the district for a
teacher's negligence, at least absent actual notice and deliberate
indifference.
There were two disability discrimination cases last term which I
will address briefly. The first was Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections v. Yeskey. 131 This case raised the question whether
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),132 covers
inmates in state prisons. The plaintiff was sentenced to serve 18-
36 months in a state correctional facility, but the judge offered
Yeskey an option of choosing instead to go to a "motivational boot
camp" for first time offenders. 33  If he did and successfully
completed that program, he would be eligible for parole in just six
months, but Yeskey was refused admission to the boot camp
because his medical history showed he suffered from
hypertension.1 34 He brought suit under the ADA claiming that his
exclusion from the boot camp constituted unlawful discrimination
on the basis of disability. The District Court dismissed the suit,
finding that the ADA is not applicable to inmates in state
prisons. 3 The Third Circuit reversed.'
36
In a short, unanimous and straightforward decision, Justice Scalia
concluded that the statutory language is unambiguous and plainly137 n
covers state institutions, with no exception for state prisons. The
statute provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall,
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a
131 118 S. Ct. 1952 (1998) (hereinafter Yeskey).
132 42 U.S.C. § 1213 et seq. Title 1H provides that
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
133 Yeskey, supra note 130, at 1954.
134 Id.
135 id.
136 118 F.3d 168 (3rd Cir. 1997).
137 Yeskey, supra note 130, at 1954 (finding that "state prisons fall squarely
within the statutory definition of 'public entity', which includes 'any
department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrmentality of a State
or States or local government' as cited in 42 U.S.C. § 12131(l)(B).
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public entity."' 38  Justice Scalia rejected the state's somewhat
unusual argument that state prisons do not provide prisoners with
the benefits of programs, services or activities. 139 To the contrary,
he said, "modem prisons provide inmates with many recreational
activities, medical services, and educational and vocational
programs, all of which, at least theoretically, benefit the
prisoners."' 140 He also rejected the argument that the ADA requires
voluntary participation in these services and programs, noting that
the statute does not require voluntariness and, even if it did,
participation in this boot camp is indeed voluntary.'1
4
Significantly, the Court rejected as irrelevant the state's argument
that Congress never envisioned that the ADA would apply to
prisoners. 42 Justice Scalia said "the fact that a statute can be
applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does
not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.
143
Similarly, there is no reason to apply the doctrine of constitutional
doubt, which requires an interpretation that avoids grave and
doubtful constitutional questions, because that doctrine only
applies where a statute is capable of multiple meanings.
One question left unresolved by the Court is whether application
of the ADA to state prisons is a constitutional exercise of
Congress' power under either the Commerce Clause or Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because that issue was not
raised in the District Court or the Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court declined to consider it.
144
The second disability case of the term is a far lengthier opinion
with as much medicine in it as law. Bragdon v. Abbott 145 is a case
brought by a woman with asymptomatic HIV whose dentist
refused to fill a cavity of hers in his office, instead requiring that
the procedure be done in a hospital.
146
13 842US.C. § 12132. See note 131,supra.
139 Yeskey, supra note 130, at 1955.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)).
'44 Id. at 1956.
145 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) (hereinafter Bragdon).
146 Id. at 2201.
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Abbott brought suit under state law'47 and Section 302 of the
ADA, 48 alleging discrimination on the basis of her disability.1
49
Section 302 prohibits exclusion from a public accommodation on
the basis of a disability, and it specifically defines "public
accommodation" as including "the professional office of a health
care provider."150  The statute, however, provides an exception
where "the individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of
others." 151 The two issues in the case are whether asymptomatic
[HV is a disability within the meaning of the statute, and whether
the treatment of the plaintiff in the dentist's office would have
posed a direct threat to the health or safety of the dentist or nurses
on his staff. The District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and
the First Circuit affirmed.' 5 2 The Supreme Court agreed that
asymptomatic HIV is a disability within the meaning of the statute
because it is a physical impairment and it substantially limits a
major life activity.153 The Court was not troubled by the fact that
in plaintiff's case the disease had not progressed to the
symptomatic phase. "In light of the immediacy with which the
virus begins to damage the infected person's white blood cells and
the severity of the disease, we hold it is an impairment from the
moment of infection."'154 HIV causes abnormalities in a person's
blood and the infected person's white cell count continues to drop.
Thus, "HIV must be regarded as a physiological disorder, with a
constant and detrimental effect on the infected person's hemic and
lymphatic systems from the moment of infection. IV infection
147 Id. at 2201. The state law provisions were not before the Court.
148 Americans with Disabilities Act § 302, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) provides
"No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who ...
operates a place of public accommodation."
49 912 F. Supp. 580, 585-87 (D. Me. 1996), aff'd, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir.
1997).
150 The term "public accommodation" is defined to include the "professional
office of a health care provider at 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
"' 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3).
152 912 F. Supp. 580, 585-87 (D. Me. 1996), aff'd, 107 F.3d 934 (Ist Cir.
1997).
153 Bragdon, supra note 144, at 2207.
'-4 Id. at 2204.
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satisfies the statutory and regulatory definition of a physical
impairment at every stage of the disease."'
155
The Court then went on to consider whether the impairment
affects a major life activity, as required by the statute. The opinion
becomes quite interesting at this point. The major life activity that
the plaintiff said was limited by her HIV status was
reproduction. 156 The Court noted that other plaintiffs would have
pointed to other major life activities as being affected and impaired
or substantially limited by HIV, but since Abbott only identified
reproduction, the Court limited itself to whether reproduction is
indeed a major life activity. 157  The Court had little trouble
concluding that reproduction "falls well within the phrase 'major
life activity"' because "reproduction and the sexual dynamics
surrounding it are central to the life process itself.'' 58  In so
concluding, the Court rejected the argument that Congress
intended the ADA only to cover life activities that have a public,
economic, or daily dimension.'
59
Having found that reproduction is a major life activity, the Court
addresses the question of whether Abbott's HIV status
substantially limits that activity. 60 Relying on medical literature,
the Court concludes that it does in two different ways. First, a
woman with HIV who attempts to conceive a child imposes a risk
on the man with whom she is having sex of transmission of the
HIV disease. 16 1  Second, a woman who conceives a child is
imposing a threat of transmitting the disease to her own child
during gestation and childbirth.'62 Although conception and
childbirth are not impossible for an individual with HIV, the ADA
does not require absolute impossibility to perform a major life
activity, only a substantial limitation of that activity. Thus, the
Court concludes that asymptomatic HIV does constitute a
disability within the meaning of the statute because it is a physical
155 Id.
156 Id.
117 Id. at 2205.
158 Id.
159 id.
16 Id. at 2206.
161 Id.
162 id.
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impairment that does substantially limit reproduction, a major life
activity.
Having determined that plaintiff suffered from a disability, the
Court still had to determine whether that impairment posed a direct
threat to the health or safety of others, specifically the dentist.
163
The Court said that the assessment has to be determined
objectively.164 Thus, a good faith belief by the dentist that the
impairment posed a risk would not relieve the doctor of liability if
that belief were not objectively reasonable. 165 In determining the
reasonableness of the defendant's action, the views of public health
authorities such as the United States Public Health Service and
National Institute of Health should be given special weight and
authority, although if a health care professional disagrees with the
prevailing medical consensus, he or she may refute it by citing a
credible scientific basis for deviating from the accepted norm. 
66
Ultimately, the Court concluded that on the record, it could not
determine whether the First Circuit had sufficient evidence to
conclude as a matter of law that plaintiff's impairment did not pose
a risk, and the case was remanded for further consideration of that
issue.
167
In an interesting dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and O'Connor, takes issue with the
conclusion that reproduction is a major life activity, equating it
instead with decisions such as who to marry, where to live and
how to earn one's living.' 68 These are important decisions but not
repetitively performed nor essential in the day to day existence of a
normally functioning individual. The dissent also disagrees with
the conclusion that asymptomatic HIV substantially limits
reproduction, because a person infected with IRV still can engage
in sexual intercourse and give birth to a child. The fact that an
individual infected with HIV might not engage in those activities is
treated by the dissent as a voluntary choice, not a substantial
limitation imposed by the impairment. Further, because a claim of
163 Id. at 2209-10.
'64 Id. at 2210.
16 5 Id.
166 Id. at 2211.
167 Id. at 2212.
168Id. at 2214-15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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disability must be evaluated on a particularized basis, in terms of
how the impairment is affecting this individual, the dissent would
require the plaintiff to demonstrate that, were it not for her HIV
status, she would have attempted reproduction. In other words, the
dissent would require plaintiff to prove that her plan, before she
was diagnosed, was to have children.1
69
The final case of the term presents a completely different genre
of discrimination. Miller v. Albright' is not a statutory case,
rather it raises an equal protection claim that challenges a
distinction contained in Section 309 of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act 7' that treats out of wedlock children of citizen
mothers differently from out of wedlock children of citizen fathers.
Pursuant to the statute, a child of a citizen mother is treated as a
citizen at birth, whereas a child of a citizen father is not.'72
The plaintiff in Miller was born in the Philippines.'73 Her mother
was a Filipino national and her father was an American citizen,
who served in the United States Air Force and was stationed in the
Philippines at the time of the child's conception.' The mother
and father were never married and indeed there is no evidence that
the father had any contact with the child at all, returning after his
tour of duty to the United States.'75 Many years after the child's
birth, the father commenced a paternity proceeding, which resulted
169 Id. at 2216.
170 118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998).
171 Immigration and Naturalization Act, § 309(a)(4), 66 Stat. 238, amended by
8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4) (1986). This section provides in pertinent part:
(a) The provisions ... of section 1401 of this title, and of paragraph (2)
of section 1408 of this title, shall apply as of the date of birth to a person
born out of wedlock if--
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years--
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person's residence or
domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under
oath, or
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a
competent court. Id.
172 Id.
173 Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1432 (1998). Miller was born on June
20, 1970. Id.
174 Id. at 1432-33.
175 Id.
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in a decree declaring him to be the father.'76 When the child
applied for citizenship, she was denied on the ground that the
Immigration and Naturalization Act (hereinafter '"NA") "requires
that a child born out of wedlock be legitimized before age eighteen
in order to acquire U.S. citizenship.""' Since the paternity
proceeding was brought after the plaintiff turned eighteen, the
statutory requirements had not been satisfied.
The father and child brought suit, claiming that the INA's
different treatment of citizen mothers and citizen fathers violated
the equal protection guarantee of the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment.'79 Pursuant to the statutory scheme, four
requirements must be satisfied in order for a child of a citizen
father and an alien mother to obtain citizenship-I) the blood
relationship between the child and the father must be established
by clear and convincing evidence, 2) the father had the nationality
of the United States at the time of the child's birth, 3) the father
has agreed in writing to provide financial support for the child until
age eighteen and 4) while the child is under the age of eighteen, the
child is legitimated, or the father acknowledges paternity in writing
under oath, or the child's paternity is adjudicated by a court."
Because Immigration and Naturalization Services' (hereinafter
INS) rejection of plaintiffs claim for citizenship was based solely
on her failure to satisfy the fourth requirement, that became the
only issue on appeal--whether the requirement that children born
out of wedlock to citizen fathers, but not citizen mothers, must
obtain formal proof of paternity before age eighteen violates the
Fifth Amendment. 8 '
176 Id. at 1433. In 1992, the father filed a petition in a Texas court to establish
his paternity. Id. The court found him to be the "biological and legal father of
Lorelyn Panero Miller." Id.
n Id. (citing § 309(a)(4) INA as applicable to § 301(g) INA in regard to the
statutory basis for acquiring citizenship).
178 Id. "Without such legitimization before age eighteen, there is no legally
recognized relationship under the INA and the child acquires no rights of
citizenship through an American citizen parent." Id. (further citation omitted).
179 U.S. CONST., amend V. The Due Process Clause provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.. . ." Id.
"0 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
'81 Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1436.
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This case produced five different opinions. In total, six judges
rejected plaintiffs claim, although for very different reasons, and
three justices found an equal protection violation. Since the topic
for today is discrimination, I will leave for another day any
discussion of the thorny jurisdictional issues raised in these
opinions and focus exclusively on the equal protection analysis.
One issue that divided the justices is the standard that should be
used in evaluating the equal protection claim. The answer to this
question arguably depends on whose claim we are evaluating--the
father's claim or the child's claim. Justices Stevens and Rehnquist
applied mid-level scrutiny to both claims: the child's claim seeking
to have her citizenship confirmed by the court, and her father's
claim that citizen fathers should have the same right to transmit
citizenship as citizen mothers.'82 Mid-level scrutiny, of course,
requires that the statutory distinction be substantially related to an
important government objective. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,
concurring in the judgment, rejected the father's claim on standing
grounds and applied only rational basis review to the child's claim
because, in their view, the challenged statute does not draw a
distinction based on the gender of the child so the child has not
suffered from gender based discrimination.'83 Under the rational
basis test, they have no trouble upholding the statute although they
indicate that it could not withstand mid-level review. The
dissenting Justices, Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer, applied mid-
level scrutiny to both the father and child's claim and found that
the statutory classification could not withstand this heightened
review. "'
The decision for the Court, I suppose, is represented in Justice
Stevens' opinion, although it is only joined by the Chief Justice,
which concludes that the classification survives mid level
scrutiny.'85 Ensuring reliable proof of a biological relationship
between the potential citizen and its citizen parent constitutes an
important governmental objective and that objective is served by
requiring proof of paternity where the citizen parent is the father.'86
112Id. at 1439-42.
183 Id. at 1442 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
184 Id.
185 Id. at 1442
181Id. at 1439.
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Where the citizen parent is the mother, the blood relationship is
immediately obvious, so additional steps are not necessary.'
In addition to establishing proof of a biological relationship, the
statutory distinction effectively serves two other important
objectives, according to the Court.'88 First is the interest in
encouraging the development of a healthy relationship between the
citizen parent and the child and the second is the related interest in
fostering ties between the foreign born child and the United
States." 9 Congress could well have been concerned about the
phenomenon of American servicemen fathering children abroad,
and then returning to this country, sometimes not even knowing
that a child had been born. It was surely reasonable, the Court
concludes, for Congress to "condition the award of citizenship to
such children on an act that demonstrates, at a minimum, the
possibility that those who become citizens will develop ties with
this country-a requirement that performs a meaningful purpose
for citizen fathers but normally would be superfluous for citizen
mothers."1ue
In addition to finding that important governmental objectives
support the additional requirements imposed on children of citizen
fathers, the Court further concluded that the means used in the
statute are well tailored to serve these objectives.
Many of you may remember a 1983 New York immigration case
involving a substantially similar classification, Lehr v. Robinson,'
that the Court said fully supports its conclusion in Miller." In
Lehr, the Court upheld a New York law that also distinguished
between unmarried fathers and unmarried mothers.""3 Lehr
involved the rights of a parent to receive notification of an
adoption and to veto the adoption. Like the statute at issue in this
case, the New York law granted those rights to unmarried fathers
only if a formal act establishing paternity had been taken. The
187 rd.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 463 U.S. 248 (1983)
192 Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1440.
193 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264.
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Court concluded that the equal protection argument was even less
persuasive in the current case than in Lehr.94
Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer dissented. I particularly
recommend Justice Ginsburg's dissent to you because it contains a
fascinating historical account of how our immigration laws have
discriminated against women over centuries. 9" While the case at
bar challenges a classification that seemingly burdens men, our
immigration laws historically have done just the opposite-laws on
the transmission of citizenship from parent to child starkly
discriminated against citizen mothers, not citizen fathers. For
example, statutes enacted in 1790, 1795, and 1802 all provided that
a child born abroad could only gain citizenship when the father
was a citizen. Thus, women were unable to transmit their
citizenship to their children born abroad.
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion argues forcefully that mid-
level scrutiny is the appropriate standard and that the classification
at issue fails the test because it relies on overbroad generalizations
that mothers are significantly more likely than fathers to care for
their children or to develop relationships with their children.'96
Justice Breyer illustrates that with a number of examples, including
one where he hypothesizes a family consisting of an American
mother and a foreign father. The child is conceived and born
abroad and then the mother returns to the United States leaving the
father to raise the child. Why should not this mother be required to
fulfill the statutory requirements currently imposed only on citizen
fathers? Justice Breyer notes that this example "suggests how
arbitrary the statute's gender-based distinction is once one
abandons the generalization that mothers, not fathers, will act as
caretaker parents."'97
Justice Breyer had no trouble agreeing with Justice Stevens that
there are important objectives sought to be served by the
classification-ensuring reliable proof of a biological relationship
and encouraging ties between the parent and child, and between
the child and the United States. 9 ' He disagrees, however, when it
194 Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1440.
'
9
' Id. at 1450-52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
196 Id. at 1455-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
197 Id. at 1461 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
198 Id. at 1456 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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comes to determining whether or not the statutory classification
substantially furthers those objectives.' He concludes that they
do not and that in fact the relationship between the statutory
requirements and the stated objectives is one of total misfit.'
Let me end, since we are in baseball playoff season, with a
scorecard. From the plaintiff's point of view, it is five to two. Out
of seven discrimination cases, it looks like a clear victory for
discrimination plaintiffs in five cases, the three Title VII cases and
the two disability discrimination cases, verses two wins for the
defendant, the Title IX case and the immigration case. I hope the
Yankees do as well. Thank you.
199 Id. at 1463 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
200 Id.
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